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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is preparing a 
Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear in three volumes: 
Vdume I :  Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience of producers and 
users of systems analysis 
Vdume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts who need basic knowiedge of 
methods in which they are not expert; the volume contains introductory over- 
views of such methods 
Volume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems analyses that illustrate 
the methods and diversity of systems analysis 
Volume 1 will have ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2 Applied systenrs ar~alysis: a genetic approach 
3. Examples of systems analysis 
4 The method of applied systems analysis: find~ng a solution 
5. Formlllating problems for systems analysis 
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6. Generating alternatives for systems analysis 
7. Estimating and predicting consequences 
8 Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10. Principles of good practice 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis terms and a bibliogra- 
phy of basic books in the field. 
Drafts of this material are being widely circulated for comments and sugges- 
tions for improvement In addition to responding to such interventions, the task of de- 
tailed coordination of the chapters-prepared separately by several authors-has yet to be 
carried out Correspondence about this material should be addressed to the undersigned. 
This Working Paper is the first draft of Chapter 2. Its purpose is to provide 
an intellectual (as distinct from an administrative) history of systems analysis. The  au- 
thor has striven for as much comprehensiveness as feasible in modest compass Howev- 
er, the sources available to him were larply western, as is his own experience. Thus, it 
is hoped that the next revision of this draft will unite both eastern and western experi- 
ence. 
A word about the format of this Working Paper. In order to make the text 
of each chapter easily amended, it has been entered into the IIASA computer, from 
which the current version can be reproduced in a few minute's time whenever needed. 
This Working Paper was produced from the version current on the date shown on each 
Page- 
Hugh J. Miser 
Survey Project 
April 28, 1980 
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APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: 
A G E N E T I C  A P P R O A C H  
Giandomenico Majone 
1. C H A N G E  A N D  C O N T I N U I T Y  
An adequate account of a field of inquiry should be capable of explaining its 
continuities as well as its changes-possibly in terms of the same underlying process. 
Considered over a sufficiently long period of time, a discipline like physics changes quite 
radically in its objects of inquiry, its methods, and its aims. Yet, despite such changes, 
the discipline maintains a recognizable continuity; less because of a common professional 
commitment to a central core of principles or key questions, than because the problems on 
which successive generations of physicists have focused their attention are connected by 
recognizable lines of descent. These problems form, to iise Toulmin's expression, a 
"gvrredogyW of issues and of related concepts and toois. 1 
Similarly, the development of applied systems anaiysis ( A s k )  over the iast 
forty or so years reveals considerable changes in intellectual contents: methods, and aims. 
T h e  tactical problems that formed the main nhject-s nf inquiry nf np~ratinns research 
'stephen Toulmin, Human Onder;:anding, vol. 1, Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 19%. pp. 134- 144. 
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(OR) during World War 2 have been followed by the strategic problems investigated 
by defense analysts in the 1950s and 1960s Today's policy analysts focus on social and 
economic problems: regulation and pollution control, e n e r a  and education, housing and 
health care. T h e  accompanying changes In methods have been equally strikir~g: from 
the relatively simple da ta  analyses and differential equations of the early mllitary appli- 
cations to the static and dynamic optimization models of contemporary OR, to the 
econometric models of policy analysis Aims have also changed. If the goal of the first 
analysts of military operations was essentially empirical-to give a scientific explanation 
of the facts, and to make successful predictions of the effectiveness of new weapons and 
new tactics, that of the systems and policy analyses is primarily prescriptive-to assist the 
decisionmaker in choosing among alternative courses of action. And we are now begin- 
ning to recognize a third legitimate function or aim for ASA, as a vehicle of persuasion 
and argumentation in the policy debate. 
T h e  question immediately facing the historian of A S A  is whether an under- 
lying continuity can be detected below these changes in problems, methods, and disci- 
plinary aims. O r  should one rather speak of mutations that have altered in fundamental 
ways the original enterprise? A good argument could be made in favor of the mutation 
hypothesis; yet the weight of the evidence favors the hypothesis of continuity, as T shall 
try to show. T h e  difficulties of the prmf should nnt be underestirnatd, however. In 
mature disciplines like physics or mathematics, essential continuity is maintained by the 
joint operation of a dual process of intellectual innovation and critical evaluation and 
selection. T h e  pool of available theories arid methods is continually enriched by intellec- 
tual novelties, but ljtily a few of the novelties survive the severe tests to which they slre 
exposed. In this way disciplinary identity can be maintained over considerabie periods 
of time. But in order for this dual process of innc-:ation and selection to work satisfac- 
torily, there must be prnfessional 'forums of competition" (Toalmin) within which new 
ideas can survive long enough to show their merits and defects, but in which they are 
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also criticized and eliminated with enough severity to maintain the coherence of the 
discipline. 2 
By contrast, ASA is still a maturing field in which the rate of intellectual in- 
novation is much greater than the rate of critical selection. Hence a proliferation of 9- 
proaches and 'schools' that seem to have little in common. And because of the fragility 
of the existing mechanisms of quality control, the survival or rejection of intellectual no- 
velties seems to depend more on academic fashion and external support than on a sober 
assessment of their potentialities-as shown by the examples of game theory, value theory, 
or program budgeting. 
T h e  example of program budgeting suggests another important reason why 
the evolutionary model of "conjectures and refutationsn is so much more complex in the 
case of ASA than in the traditional academic disciplines. ASA is a form (indeed, the 
main form) of articulate intervention into ongoing action programs.3 This  means that the 
conceptual innovations proposed by systems analysts will be evaluated not only by the 
canons of disciplinary criticism, but also according to criteria of social effectiveness. New 
proposals must fit into a certain intellectual tradition or research program (like all con- 
ceptual novelties), must also be adapted to, and adopted by, an onping social process or 
action program (a. problem which theoretical innovations do not have to face). Depend- 
ing on time and circumstances, one or the other criterion-pmfessinnal quabty or social 
effectiveness-may prevail; but in the long run, it is doubtful that an analytic proposal 
can survive without meeting some minimal standards of adequacy a!ong bcth dimension:. 
I have already referred to Toulmin's "genealogy d problems" as itis element 
by which a field of intellectual hiquiry preserves its disciplinary ideritity. We iari see 
now that in the case of ASA we should rather speak of a lattice of descendant prob- 
4 lems, to signify the fact that the problems of systems analys~s do not develop along dls- 
'stephen Toulmin, Human U x d r r s t a z d i ~ g ,  ci., t ch. 1. 
)Hglton Bmthroyd, AnicuIate l n l e ~ e n l i o n ,  London: Taylor and Francis, 1978. See 
also, ~iandornenico Majone, 'Policies as Theories," Omega, Gol. 8, no. 2, pp.151-162. 
'I borrow this expression from J.R. Ravetz; see his Sdentific Knowledge and its Social 
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ciplinary (or even interdisciplinary) lines only, but inevitably mix with problems 
derived from political, social, and institutional sources. 
In our reconstruction we shall also have to bear constantly in mind that like 
any other historically developing intellectual enterprise, ASA has two aspects. We ca i  
think of it as a (composite) discipline comprising, at any given point in time, a stock of 
theories, conceptual frameworks, and techniques for dealing with theoretical and practical 
problems; or we can view it as a profession comprising a set of institutions, roles, and 
people whose business it is to apply and improve those methods and techniques. Hence 
our account of the evolution of ASA falls into two parts, one dealing with disciplinary 
developments (Sections 2-4). the other with institutional and professional developments 
(Sections 5 and 6). Each part, by itself, gives an inadequate and distorted view of the 
field. A purely intellectual history of methodological developments cannot explain, for 
example, why O R  developed along quite different lines, after the War, in the United 
States and in Britain or Canada (or why, for that matter, industrial engineering did not 
develop into something like operations research already in the 1930s). On the other 
hand, a study of professional organizations, roles (in industry, government, and the 
universities), and institutional mechanisms of evaluation and control (journals, confer- 
ences, policy research institutes) has more than sociological interest only if it is related to 
t h ~  historically developing cngnitive basis of ASA. 
2. F R O M  O P E R A T I O N S  RESEARCH TO SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
P.M.S. Blackett, the Nobel-prize-winning British physicist who was a leader 
of the early O R  wurk, wrute iwu shurt but influential mernoraida toward the end of 
1941: "Scientists at the Operational Level" (written in order to inform the Admiralty of 
developments that had taken place in the Operational Research Sectlons already esta- 
blished at different Commands of the Royal Air  Fclrc~), and "A Nnr? on Cprtain As- 
--- 
Problems, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973, especially pp.19 1-199. 
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pects of the Methodology of Operationd Research" ("an attempt to ~t out, for the 
benefit of new scientific recruits to the operational research sections, =me of the princi- 
ples that had been found to underlie the work of the first two years of the war"4. TO- 
gether with another paper written by the same authur a few years after the end of the 
War, -The Scope of Operational ~ e s e a r c h . ~  these notes represent not only some of the 
earliest, but also some of the clearest and most insightful discussions of the principles of 
O R  as practiced during the 1940s. 
T h e  first step in the establishment of a sphere of professional autonomy is a 
claim to 'cognitive exclusivenessw over some portion of reality7 Consequently, Blackett 
takes great pains to differentiate the functions of the operations analysts from those of 
their closest potential competitors, technical services on the one hand, and operational 
staffs, on the other: 
T h e  object of having scientists in close touch with operations is to enable 
operational staffs to obtain scientific advice on those matters which are not handled by 
the service technical establishments. 
Operational staffs provide the scientists with the operational out!ook and 
data. T h e  scientists apply scientific methods of analysis to these data, and are thus able 
to give useflll advice. 
T h e  main field of their activity is clearly the analysis of actual operations, us- 
ing as data the material to be found in an cjperation room ... 
It will be noted that these data are not, and on secrecy grounds cannot, in 
general, be made available to the technical establi hments. Thus scientific analysis if 
done at all, must be done in or near operation rooms. 8 
For example, weapon A is calculated by the technical department nf a service 
to be 50 percent more efficient than weapon B. In actual operations, over a given period 
of tiiie, B scores 4 successe; while P. scores only 2. Is this sufficien: evidecce to reject 
the estimates of the technical department and proceed as if B were the better weapcjn? 
Hcte the role of the operations aialyst is similar to that of the statistician Faiing a sta-I- 
two memoranda, the second one reproduced in a text dated from May 1943, can 
now be found in P.M.S. Blackett, Studies of War,  New York: Hill and Wang, 1962, 
.169- 198. 
'&enztionaI Research Quarterly, vol. I ,  no. 1, 1950; now in Studies of War ,  cit, 
qp. 199-2M. 
Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
niversity of Califorr~ia Press, 1977. 
.MS. Blackett, op. cit., p.171. 
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dard problem in statistical inference. His  task is to try to reject the null hypothesis- 
represented by the estimates of the technical department. 
As  another typical example of operations analysis, Blackett considers the 
problem of discovering tho best use, under actual operating conditions, of a new device. 
Operations researchers can perform a useful function here by interpreting the 'opera- 
tional facts of lifew to technical people, and technical possibilities to the operational statf; 
i.e., by operating in a liaison capacity between the operational staff, the technical depart- 
ment which produced the device, and the development unit 
Particularly in times of war, the demand for new weapons and technical 
gadgets tends to become overwhelming. But, Blackett points out, relatively tm much 
scientific effort is expended in the production of new devices and too little in the proper 
use of what is already available. Hence, another important task of operations research 
consists in providing numerical estimates of the value of changing over from one device 
to another, by investigation of the actual performance of existing systems, and by analysis 
of the likely performance of new ones. Incidentally, it will be noted how clearly Blackett 
prefigures here the future development of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis 
which was to play such a large role in systems analysis in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Having established a sphere of autonomy for a problem-solving approach 
that is neither purely technical, nor exclusively operational, but partakes of both func- 
tions, Blackett goes on to r a i s  three methodological questions about OR: Is it scientific? 
Is it new? If so, in what ways? 
Now, if one accepts the usual characterization of operations research as the 
application of the scientific method to the study of operations, then the a-iswer to the first 
question must be "yesm-by definition. The  trouble with this characterization is that there 
is nc unique "scientific method," least of ali In the sense of a set of mechanical rules that 
would allow me  to move safely from data to conclusions. I t  is true that the pioneers nf 
operations research, men like P.M.S. Blackett. C.H. Waddington, P.M. Morse, G.E. 
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Kimball, and B.O. Kmpm an were scientists-physicists, biologists, and mathematicians 
of hlgh caliber. But what they brought to the new field was not a particular "method," 
or even advanced scientific knowledge, but a new perspective and a set d superb craft 
skills in examining the available evidence, considering what ccrnclusions could be drawn 
from it, and deciding what other information was required, and how it could be ob- 
truned. 9 
This distinction is important because the view of science as craftsman's work 
(and it is precisely in this sense that operations research or ASA may be considered 
scientific, as 1 have argued at sane length elsewherel4 leads to quite different methodo- 
logical positions from those suggested by a vulgar-positivistic view of science. A dog- 
matic interpretation of the nature of scientific method can easily lead to an attitude 
which John Tukey has recently expressed in the epigram: "We don't want to try to 
measure anything where we cannot be proud of the measurement ' The  crafts- 
man, on the other hand, tries to do his best with the materials and tools at his disposal- 
always keeping in mind Aristotle's dictum that "precision is not to be sought for ahke in 
all discussion, any more than in all the products of the crafts ... .' See, for example, what 
Blacken has to say about the use of rough data in operations research: 
No pregnant problem should be left unattended for lack of exact numerical 
data, for often it is found on doing the analysis thae some significant conclusions recom- 
mending concrete action can be drawn even with very rough data. In other cases this is, 
of course, not sn But till the problem is worked out, one cannot tell. 
It often happens that when the problem has been worked through in a very 
rwgh form, it is found that data which were thought to be important are actually unim- 
portant, and vice versa.. . It must always be remembered that the object of the andysis 
is practical-thae is, that it should lead to action. Attempts at undue and unnecessary 
 here is an intereling analogy with the take-over in the late 1440s of theoretical biolo- 
gy by men origmally trained in physics. The  development of molecuiar biology is essen- 
tially due to these 'emigr6" physicists,' but as Szilard has emphasized, what these men 
brought to biology was "not any skills acquired in physics, but rather an attitude: the 
conviction which few biologists had at the time, that mysteries can be solved"; see S .  
oulmin, Human Understanding, cit., p.234. 
"Giandornenico Majone, The Craft of Applied Sjstems Anu4y.ris. Laxenburg, Austr ir  
I SAY 1980. 
'?ohn W. Tukey, "Methodology, and the Statistician's Responsibility for B O T H  Accu- 
racy AND Relevance.' j o u r 3 d  of the American Statistical Asso~iy t ion,  vul. 74, no. 
?68, December 1979, pp.786-793, 786. 
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precision are to be avoided. 12 
Incidentally, the problem of making effective use of rough data is still very 
much with the policy analyst of today, as shown for example by Frederick Mosteller's in- 
sightful paper "Assessing Unknown Numbers Order  of Magr~itude Estimatiuri." 13 
Concerning the second and third questions Blackett argues that operations 
research has a considerable degree of novelty, but this relative novelty lies "not so much 
in the material to which the scientific method is applied as in the level at which work is 
done, in the comparative freedom of the investigators to seek out their own problems, 
and in the direct relation of the work to the possibilities of executive action." 14 
O f  these three distinctive features of original O R  work, the second one-the 
comparative freedom of the investigators to seek out their own problems-seems to be 
the most important. I n  fact," Blackett a d d s  "the most fertile tasks are often found by 
the [operations research] group themselves rather than given to them. Tha t  this is so is 
only to be expected, since any problem which is clearly recognized by the executives is 
likely, in an efficient organization, to be already a matter of study." 
But if this is so, it is wrong to argue, as A M .  Mood does, that industrial en- 
gineers, quality control experts, time-and-motion experts, investment counselors, product 
packagers, and personnel managers (!) have been doing operations research in industry 
"for at least a couple of generations." 15 
''P.M.s. Blackett, "Op~rational R~s~a rch , '  cit.. p. 185. 
131n Statistics and Public Policj. W.B. Fairley and F. Morteller, editors, Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 19'17. pp. 163-!S4. 
I4p.hf.s. Blackett. "Operational Research.' cit.. p.201. 
''see his critical review of Morse and Kimballls Methods of Operationr Kesearch in 
Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, vol. 1, no. 5, November 1953, 
pp.906-SM. Probably in response to this criticlsrn, Morse too began to see precursors of 
O R  everywhere: '[Tlhough the term is new, this sort of research is not new, of course. 
Taylor and his followers, with their time and motion studies, investigated a .mall part nf 
the field; traflic enpneers have been struggling with another part; systems enpneering is 
closely related, and so on." Cf. Philip M. Morse, 'Statistics and Operations Research," 
Operations Research, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1956, pp2-19, 5. 
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In fact, it seems very doubtful that any of these alleged precursors of O R  
would meet all the three criteria set down by Blackett. B e f ~ r e  the large-scale introduc- 
tion of operations research methods, most analyses of industrial operations were i.ugely 
empirical in character. Certainly, they were not carried out in that atmosphere of a 
"first-class pure scientific research institution" which, according to Blackett, is necessary 
to the effectiveness of an O R  team. And it is also doubtful that the early analysts of in- 
dustrial operations had the freedom to seek out their own problems, being usually con- 
strained by the specific research tasks assigned to them by management A s  already 
noted, social and institutional factors were probably responsible for the fact that industri- 
al engineering and "scientific management" did not actually evolve into genuine O R  
work, as the term is understood today--despite some remarkable initial successes and the 
efforts of people like Frederick Taylor and his favorite disciple, Morris Cooke, to pull 
the industrial engineer "out of his present status of being a hired servant."16 
Space does not permit p i n g  into the details of Blackett's memorandum on the 
methodology of operations research. I should like, however, to mention briefly two no- 
tions that, introduced here for the first time into the O R  literature, were to become stan- 
dard approaches in the subsequent development of systems analysis. My main reason for 
mentioning them is to point out an interesting strand nf continuity in the r?volutinn nf 
ASA. Under the name of "variational method," Blackett introduced a type of analysis 
closely analogous to the economist's marginal reasoning. According to the variational 
method, each new tactical situation is to be treated as a variation of some old one-about 
which some d a a  are always avkiabie. The  problem is to find uut huw a giver1 sysiem 
would be altered if some of the variables that determine its effectiveness were varied. 
The  practical applicabil~ty of the method depends on the fact that technical devices can- 
not change very rapidly because of the time req~uired by d ~ v e i n p m ~ n t  and prc?dl.~ctjnn; 
-otd by Magali Sarfatti L a r m .  The Rise of Profardonalisrn, cit., p.140. 
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even tactical operations do not usually change very fast, if for no other reason than the 
necessary duration of training. Thus, even if a new system B is not very similar to the 
old system A (so that the differentials of the input variables dX 1, dX2, . . . by which 
the effectiveness of B can be derived from that of A, are not very small) the results may 
be fairly reliabie. Provided common sense and judgment are used.'" 
A second interesting idea discussed in the memorandum is a method for 
comparing alternative systems under uncertainty that later came to be known as "a for- 
tiori analysis" Sometimes lower or upper bounds on the possible effectiveness of a sys- 
tem are known more accurately than the actual values. Thus, to compare a new system 
B with an existing system A whose effectiveness Y, is known, assume upper limits (i-e., 
most favorable to B) for the relevant input variables Let Y: be the estimated upper 
bound on the effectiveness of B. If Y: < Y,, then system B is certainly inferior (if 
Yb > Y, no meaningful conclusion can be derived without more calculations). Assuming 
a lower bound Y: (most unfavorable case for B), if Y: > Y,, B is certainly superior. 
Some fifteen years after Blackett's original memorandum, two well-known analysts from 
the Rand Corporation were to write that Tmbre than any other single thing, the skilled 
use of a fortiori and break-even analyses separates the professimals from the ama- 
teurs. m18 
17p.~3.  Blackett, "Operational Research.' cit, pp.180-182. In more modern language, 
Blackett is assuming that the effectiveness or yield of a system, denoted by Y, is deter- 
mined by n inputs X,, - - - ,X, : Y - F ( X , , X , .  . . . ,X , ) .  dYI( IXi  is then the marginal 
product of Xi. If the marginal products can be estimated (and Blackett discusses some 
statisticzl and analytic methods for estimating them), then the operationd effect of 
changes in input variables (weapons, tactics, training, etc.) can be estimated by means of 
the total differential: 
where Y' is the effectiveness of the new system. The interested reader should compare 
Blackett's original memorandum wlth Alan C. Enthoven's T h e  Slmple Mathematics of 
Opdmization," published as an appendix to Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, 
The Economics of Defense in the Ntl.clear Age, Cambridge, Massach~usetts: Harvard 
yniversity Press, 1967, pp.361-95. 
'~ermann Kahn and Irwin Mann, Techniques gf Sjstarns Analysis, Santa Monica, 
California- The Rand Corporation, RM-1829, December 1956. 
April 28, 1980 
Chapter 2 
Thus, before the end of World War 2, operations researchers had idready . 
developed a number of concepts and approaches whose usefulness w~uld be fully re- 
vealed in subsequerrt decades. However, it is worth pointitsg out .again that, with the not- 
able exception of search theory developed by B.O. Koopman and others in the U.S. 
Navy's Operations Research Group, successful wartime applications of operations 
research were not based on new theories or advanced technical tools, but on a sophisti- 
cated use of craft skills, learned in the scientific-laboratories, in recording, analyzing, and 
evaluating data, in establishing quantitative relationships, and in setting up testable hy- 
potheses The first textbook on operations research, Philip M. Morse and George E. 
Kim ball's M dhods of Operations ~ e r e r n d ! ~  contains no more advanced mathematics 
than multiple integration, differential equations, and continuous probabilities 
The mathematical and statistical theories which form the technical core of 
OR today-queuing theory, mathematical programming, inventory theory, network flows, 
applied stochastic processes, control theory-were developed (and sometimes 
rediscovered) after the War, with the introduction of O R  into industry and as a subject 
for teaching and research in universities. An excellent example of O R  as practiced in 
the early 1950s is Leslie C. Edie's "Traffic Delays at Toll ~ oo th s "~ ~ - f i r s t  winner of the 
Lanchester Prize awarded annually f ~ r  a book or paper making a significant cclntribution 
to the advancement of the state of the art of OR. 
Probably the most significant methodological development of the fi:st decade 
after the War was the creation of a set of efficient techniques for programming several 
activities sharing limited resources. The general problem is to determine the level of 
each activity that optimizes the output of all activities without violating the given 
19wiley, New York, 1951. The volume was first published in 1946, as a classified 
technical report, under the auspices of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and 
Development and the National Defense Research Committee. 
2%blished in the journul of the Operutions R~seorch Sokrry of America, vol. 2, no. 
2, May 1954, pp.107-188. 
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resource constraints. There are several reasons for the practical and conceptual signifi- 
cance of this development, especially the linear programming models developed by 
George B. Dantzig and other researchers. First, the mathematical problem of maximiz- 
ing m objective function subject to various ccmstraints covers a very wide range of situh- 
tions occurring in production and inventory control, in military planning, in agriculture, 
transportation, financial management, and so on. In the important special case of a linear 
(or piecewise linear) objective function and linear constraints, the solution algorithm (sim- 
plex) developed by Dantzig can be efficiently implemented with the help of a digtal 
computer, thus allowing the explicit solution of quite large programming problems. 
Second, the programming viewpoint opened up a number of important connections with 
economic theory-particularly with the neoclassical theory of production and the 'new 
welfare economics.' In this respect, great economic significance attaches to the fact that a 
direct by-product of the solution of a mathematical programming problem is a set of 
shadow prices, or Lagrange multipliers, representing the effects on the objective fhnction 
of marginal changes in one or more constraints. Finally, the linear programming ap- 
proach turned out to be significantly, and often surprisingly, related to other methods of 
importance for operations research, such as game theory, input-output analysis, and net- 
work flow theory. These different connections are discussed at great length in two land- 
mark publications of this period: -4ctizlitj Andjsis of Production and Allocation, edited 
by Tjalling C. ~ o o ~ m a n s ? '  and Linear Programming a d  Economic Ana/jsis, by 
Robert Dorfman, Paul A. Sarnuelson, and Robert Solow. 22 
As these developments (and others in inventory theory, waiting-time and re- 
placement models, and applied stochastic processes which cannot be discussed here) sug- 
gest. important changes were taking place between 1945 and 1955. in  personnel. disci- 
plinary aims, and, consequently, also in the implicit standards of evaluat~on and criticlsrn. 
While people 1ik.e Blackett, Waddington, and Morse were returning to their laboratories 
- - 
Wiley, 1951. 
n ~ e w  Y ork: McGraw-Hill. 1958. 
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and university departments, a new generation of analysts was entering the O R  scene- 
people primarily interested in the more formal aspects of scientific methodology and pro- 
ficient in mathematical mar~ipulations, but often lacking the craft skills and the mature 
critical judgment of the old masters The  gual of operations research, as the early prai- 
titioners saw it, was 'to find a scientific explanation of the facts.' T h e  phases of inves- 
tigation followed the pattern prevalent in the science laboratory: '...past operations are 
studied to determine the facts; theories are elaborated to explain the facts; and finally the 
facts and theories are used to make predictions about future operations.. '24 
Given this paradigm, the relevant standards of criticism were those of natur- 
al science. In fact, the situations investigated by operations researchers during the W a r  
were particularly well suited to such an approach. Typically, military operations could be 
regarded, without serious distortions, as being representative of a class of repetitive si- 
tuations "where theories built up in response to earlier examples of the situation could be 
checked out against later examples, monitored while proposals for improved action were 
in use, and used to detect their own dwindling validity as the situations changed.25 
Works like Edie's "Traffic Delays at Toll Booths," and C.W. Thornthwaite's "Opera- 
tions Research in ~ g r i c u l f u r e , ~  still followed the classical pattern, and explicitly ap- 
pea.led to the established criteria of validation. 
But by 1955 the fmus of professional interests had clearly sh i f td  away from 
military operations, while the scope and methods of O R  work had changed sufficiently 
to raise serious questions about the relevance of the traditional standards of eva!uation 
and criticism to contemporary professional practice. The increasing popularity of 
8 
cmiputer-baed mudels (with the attendmt seriuus prot le~ns of vdidatiun) n-I d e  the 
need for new criteria of criticism even more obvious. A consecutive reading of the 
'$c.H. Waddington. O R  in W o r l d  W a r  2 ,  london: ELEK Science Ltd., 1973, p.26. 
2 4 ~ . ~ ~ .  Blackett  'Operational Research," d.. p. 177. 
2%ylton Boothroyd. A r t i d a r e  Inmuenrion, cit., p.113. 
26~ubli thed in the journal of the Operations Research S o d e t j  of America, voi 1, n o  
2, February 1953, pp.33-38. 
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recommendations of the Lanchester Prize Committee, starting with the first report in 
1954, gives a good indication of the difficulties experienced by the profession in finding 
agreement on a set of relevant criteria of evaluation. 
k t  us return to the changa in the disciplinary composition of operations 
research. In the early stages of development, the part played by the economists in O R  
activities had been quite modest, compared to that of the natural scientists and the 
mathematicians. With the expansion of the scope of operations research in the post-War 
years, particularly in the United States, to include military strategy as well as a growing 
number of public policy problems in health, education, transportation, housing, and the 
social services, the role of the economist was bound to become increasingly irnportant-as 
shown by the election of Rand economist Charles J. Hitch to the presidency of the 
Operations Research Society of America in 1959. As  a group, ecmomists have made 
two basic contributions to the development of the field: first, a penetrating critique of 
certain conceptual inadequacies (e-g., in the selection of criteria and in the treatment of 
time) of early O R  applications, second, the proposal of an intellectual framework derived 
from decision theory and the microeconomic logic of choice as the most appropriate para- 
digm for operations research. 
A good example of the new critical attitude is Hitch's paper on "Sub- 
optimization in Operations ~ r o b l e m r ~  The  validity and usefulness of operations 
research, Hitch argues, depends to a large extent on the ability to choose the correct cri- 
terion or objective function for the problem under discussion. "Unless operations 
research develops methods of evaluating criteria and choosing good cjnes, its quantitative 
methods may prove worse Lhan useless to its clients in its new applications in government 
and industry."2s The  main criterion for judging whether the objective function chosen 
for a given level of analysis 1s the correct one is consistency with the relevant objective 
n ~ b l i s h e d  in  the Journal of the Opnotions Research Society of America, vol  1, no. $gz lp;: PP-87-99. 
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function at a higher level. Unfortunately, too many O R  studies in the past have failed 
to meet this criterion. For example, in devising a suitable strategy for the defense of na- 
val convoys against attacks by enemy submarines, one should keep in mind that the 
relevant higher level objective is winning the war. T h e  criterion of effectiveness chosen 
at the operational level should be consistent with i t  But the criterion actually used dur- 
ing the War-which amounted to maximizing the "exchange ratio" of enemy losses to 
one's own losses-is not necessarily compatible with the higher level goal. As  a matter of 
fact, the decision to increase the size of the convoys su as to improve the exchange ratio, 
disregarded a number of factors (congestion of port facilities, reduced operating efficien- 
cy of ships in large convoys, longer turnaround times, redirection of enemy effort) which 
were obviously important for the general strategy of the War. 
T h e  examples of improper suboptimization given by Hitch are mostly of a 
military nature, but the phenomenon is quite general. Thus, the sales department of a 
profit-maximizing firm is not supposed to suboptimize, e.g, to maximize the sales minus 
selling costs, but to choose actions that maximize total profits of the firm. Similarly, the 
correct goal of the production department (in terms of the profit targets of the entire or- 
ganization) is not, in general, the minimization of cost per unit of output, nor the maximi- 
zation of productivity per manlhour but, again, a mcde of operation tha.t is conducive to 
the maximizatim of tntal profits- 29  
Similar criticisms have been voiced by other economists i n  different contexts. 
Martin Feldstein, for example, writes that 'Cqluantitative method: in government 
management decisions can be extremely fruitful, but in the absence of an qpropriaie 
framework they car1 be empty algorithms which hide rnisleaciing advice in a mass of 
reassuring  calculation^."^^ H e  then goes on to argue that operations research achieves 
-- 
G a m e  to be known in the literature as 'the criterion problem" is discussed at 
great length in two early classics of systems analysis: Roland N. McKean's Efficiency in 
Government Through Systems Analysis, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958, 
and Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean's The Economics of Defense in the Nu- 
l e m  Age, cit. 
"Martin S. Feldstein. nEconomic Analysis. Operational Research, and the National 
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* 
maximum usefulness only if it is considered in a framework of economic analysis of the 
appropriate benefits and costs of alternative actions. Feldstein draws his examples from 
the experience of the British National Health Service. H e  shows that it is a mistake to 
approach health-service decisions as problems of meeting specific community "needs" 
Rather, they should be approached as problems of allocating scarce health resources 
among competing uses For example, operations researchers have made elaborate calcu- 
lations of the number of hospital beds needed to meet doctors' requests in a given region, 
without raising probing questions about the optimal number of beds, where the benefits 
of hospitalization and longer stay are weighed against alternative uses of scarce health 
resources. 
In part, these criticisms reflect the traditional opposition between the economic 
viewpoint, which is concerned with fmding the best allocation of given resources among 
competing ends, and the technical viewpoint, which is concerned with finding the best 
way of using given resources to achieve a single end. But in a deeper sense what is at 
issue here is the appropriate conceptualization of the system under investigation. T h e  
economist's recommendation for avoiding the pitfalls of suboptimization is the "golden 
rule" of allocative efficiency: scarce resources having alternative uses should be allocated 
m as to make each resource equally scarce (i.e., equally valuable at the margin) in all 
uses. But allmative efficiency can be achieved only if resources can be freely combined 
and substituted for each other according to their relative prices or xarcities-less hospi- 
tal beds and more outpatient services, less air support and more ground forces. In this 
logic, the internal organization of the system is irrelevant if not positively misleading, 
since it tempts the analyst to make the scope of the analysis coincide with the boundaries 
of administrative units and decision-making authority. 
Thus it is only a slight overstatement to say that the diflerence between the 
traditional operations researcher and the ecnnomist-turned-systems-analyst is that the 
---- 
Health Service,' Oxford Economic Papers, March 1963, pp.19-31,21. 
April 28, 1980 
Drafk28-Apr-80 - 1 7 -  Chapter 2 
traditional operations researcher first establishes what the system to be studied is, and 
then inquires about the problems of that system, while the systems analyst first deter- 
mines what the real problem is, and only then inquires about the appropriate system or 
systems within which this probiem must be considered if it is to be fruitfully solved. 3 1 
T h e  emphasis on 'system design' (as opposed to the static analysis of given aiternatives), 
characteristic of so much early writing on systems analysis, fits quite naturally the new 
decision-making paradigm; although, paradoxically, it implicitly reintroduces many of 
the institutional and political factors whose influence the microeconomic paradigm of al- 
locative efficiency had attempted to minimize. A s  we shall see, policy analysis emerges 
in the late 1960s as an attempt to reconcile the opposing logics of "economic rationality" 
and political rationalitym-broadly understood. But in the period we are considering now 
(from the early 1950s to mid-1960s) the success of the economic paradigm in transform- 
ing early-vintage operations research into a more ambitious and intellectually, if not 
technically, more sophisticated systems analysis is almost complete. Cost-effectiveness 
analysis, modeling, optimal timing of projects, gaming, grand strategy: everything seems 
to fall into its proper conceptual place now. 
It is true that micrceconomic logic does not deal adequately with decision- 
making under uncertainty. But economists were quick to close the gap by appropriating 
decisir~n theory-an approach to the problem of choice under uncertainty originally 
developed by probabilists, but so general in scope that it could claim, with some justifica- 
tion, to include operations research as well as wide areas of economics and 3atis:ics. 
Thus, the new paradigm seemed to have an answer for all problems of choice, at least in 
Systelns analysis came to br widely regarded as a d e i i s i ~  trchnulyy, ccn-  
cerned not with how systems behave. but how they should behave. A prescriptive ap- 
proach to dec i s ionmak i~  was the new symbol of rationality, in industry and in govern- 
3 1 ~ a l c o l m  W. Hoag, W h r t  is a System?: 09erationr Rerearc.4, vol. 5, no. 3, June 
57, pp.445-447. 
"See, for example. Kenneth J. Arrow. "Decision Theory and Operations Research," 
Operations Research, vol. 5, no. 6, December 1957, pp.765-774. 
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ment, displacing the earlier emphasis on prediction and the 'scientific explanation of the 
facts.' 
3. FROM SYSTEMS ANALYSIS TO POLICY ANALYSIS 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is simply a method of setting out the factors that 
have to be taken into account in making economic choices, particularly in the case of in- 
vestment projects, for the purpose of maximizing the present value of all benefits minus 
that of all costs, subject to given constraints This technique of economic calculation had 
been given special attention in one of the early and most influential discussions of systems 
analysis, McKean's Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis (1958), which 
was primarily concerned with water resources development. Perhaps for this reason, 
CBA became almost identified with systems analysis in the mind of many people, profes- 
sionals as well as laymen-despite the warning by two well-known economists that CBA 
is 'only a technique for taking decisions within a framework which has to be decided 
upon in advance and which involves a wide range of considerations, many of them of a 
political or social c h a r a ~ t e r . " ~ ~  Although the claim made by some advocates, that CBA 
is "a natural and logical extension" of systems analysis and operations research, seems in 
retrospect rather exaggerated, there is some truth in the statement that is "more ambi- 
tious than them in evaluative scope and in technique.'% Hence by examining, however 
briefly, the underlying purpose of CBA and the type of relationship between analyst and 
decisionmaker which it implies, we can gain a better understmdifig of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the economist's approach, and its significance for the development of sys- 
tems analysis. 35 
')A.R. Prest and R. Turvey, "Cost-Benefit Analps:  A Survey," Economic journal. 
vol. 75, 1 S 5 ,  pp.683-735, 685. 
34~lan Williams, 'Cost-Benefit Analysix Bastard Science? A n d / o r  Insidious Poison 
in the Body Politick?' Journal of public Economics, vol. I,  no. 2, August 1972, pp. 199- 
q,"."more complete treatment the reader is referred to The Principles of Pructical 
Cost-Bolefit Analysis by Robert Sugden wid Alan Willianls, Oxfvrd, England: Ox- 
ford University Press, 1918. T h e  last chapter is particularly relevant to the present dis- 
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Since C B A  is used in relation to a decision problem-how to choose between 
two or more alternative courses of action or "social statesw--it assumes a well-defined de- 
cisionmaker or group of decisionmakers And since it is typically, though not exclusiveiy, 
applied to public decisions involving the welfare of the community as a whole, the de- 
cisionmaker is supposed to act on behalf of the public interest. Leaving analytic techni- 
calities aside (choice of a discount rate, treatment of uncertainty, estimation of consumers' 
and producers' surplus, distributional weights, and so on), the distinguishing features of 
C B A  are explicitness and consistency. CBA is explicit in the sense that, in principle, all 
assumptions are clearly stated, evidence is presented, calculations and conclusions are 
reproducible. It is explicit also in the sense that it must clearly state not only the 
decisionmaker's objective function, but also the alternatives that have been examined 
and the constraints that have been used. In short, the analyst attempts to translate into a 
well-defined decision problem what was initially, in many cases, only a problem 
situation-a feeling that things are not as they should be, but without a clear idea of how 
they might be put right. 
T h e  second feature, consistency, is of crucial importance not only for CBA 
but for the entire prescriptive, or normative, approach to the analysis of decisions. W e  
have already met the problem in our discussion of suboptimization: how does nne make 
sure that lower-level decisions are consistent with higher-level ones? T h e  answer given 
there-the "golden rule" of docat ive efficiency-presupposed a centralized and fully- 
i n f~ rmed  decidonmaker, capable of estimating the marginal utilities of the available 
resources in all their possible uses. Similarly, the utility-maxiniizatiot-I rule of decision 
theory is a way of making sure that the decisionmaker's choice (under uncertainty) is 
consistent with his subjective estimates of the probability of dfferent continpncies and 
with the ~rtilities he attaches to various conditional wrcomes. The- meanings of cnn- 
cussion. 
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dstency are all relevant to the practice of CBA, but in addition to the efficiency m d  
logical aspects there is a political and ethical problem that no serious analyst can evade. 
To  quote Sugden and Williams: S6 
If decisionmakers were able to spclfy a different wt of objectives for each 
decision that they had ~JJ make, cart-benefit analysis would be, as opponents of the 
decision-making approach have allepd, little more than window-dressing. T o  ensure 
that a pet project recdvecl the sanction of cost-beneflt analysis, a decisionmaker would 
need only to revise his objectives in the appropriate way. If the analyst is to exape the 
charge of windowdressing he must be prepared, in the report that he makes of his 
analysis, to discuss the wider implications of the objectives that he has used. If, for ex- 
ample, he has been asked to use in a cost-benefit malysis of a particular medical treat- 
ment a valuation of the prolonging of life that is clearly inconsistent with current policy 
towards medical care in general, he ought to make this inconsistency clear when he re- 
ports. Otherwise the result of his work may be to mislead more than to enlighten. 
Thus the analyst should practice explicitness and preach consistency. This is 
a reasonable prescription if we assume a unique decisionmaker, or a group whose 
members share common objectives and disagree only about questions of fact. But, the 
political scientist objects, this is not at all the situation prevailing in public policy making. 
Health, education, or housing policies are not the outcomes of the choices of a unitary 
decision-making body, however powerful, but of political processes involving different 
interest groups, a variety of political and bureaucratic institutions, pressure groups, and, 
in our technological society, the analyns themselves 
The normative approach breaks down, our critic continues, because it rests on 
the fiction of a "b~nevoknt dictator" with complete information about the preferences 
and interests of all members of the community, with no preferences of his own, and capa- 
ble of fully implementing his decisions. Not surprisingly, in the microeconomic paradigm 
politics and human nature belong to the institutional or behavioral givens and are taken 
to lie outside the scope vf analysis. In fact nurmative uralysis, being a generalized logic 
of choice. terminates at the moment a decision is taken. leaving outside questions of policy 
implementation, evaluation, and termination (as distinct from model evaluation and im- 
plementation). 
-- 
5 e  Principle~ of Practicd Cost-Benefit Analjsir, dl., pp.233-23t Footnote omit- 
ted. 
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Ironically, the political scientist's critique of the economist's approach to sys- 
tems analysis is, in a sense, quite similar to the critical stance taken by economists, a de- 
cade earlier, with respect to operations research. Both criticisms revolve around the no- 
tion of suboptimization-in one case with respect to economic rationality, in the other, with 
respect to political rationality. The difference is that while the notion of economic ra- 
tionality can be precisely explicated in terms of economic efficiency (either in the pneral 
Paretian sense, or in the more special sense of allocative efficiency), no generally accepted 
explication of "political rationality" seems to exist. Consequently, attempts to differentiate 
policy analysis from systems analysis have moved along different lines. We can distin- 
guish two main directions. According to one school of thought, policy analysis is systems 
analysis writ large-in the sense that it includes, in addition to the technical and economic 
aspects of a policy problem, also those political aspects which systems analysis is supposed 
to have overlooked (whether or to what extent the charge is correct, is an empirical 
question which cannot be discussed here). Yehezkel Dror's manifesto is typical of this 
position. In policy analysis: 
1) Much attention would be paid to the political aspects of decisionmaking 
and public policy making (instead of ignoring or condescendingly disregarding political 
aspects) ... 
2) A broad conception of decisionmaking and policy making would be in- 
volved (instead of viewing all decisionmaking as mainly a resurces allocation) ... 
3) A main emphasis would be on creativity and search for new policy alter- 
natives, with explicit attention to encouragement of innovative thinking ... 
4) There would be extensive reliance on ... qualitative methods ... 
5) There would be much more emphasis on futuristic thinking. .. 
6) The approach would be looser and less rigid, but nevertheless systernaric, 
one which would recognize the complexity of means-ends interdependence, the multipli- 
city of r g p a n t  criteria of decision, and the partial and tentative nature of every 
atldysis.. 
S'~eherkel Dror, "Policy Analysts: A New Professional Role in Government Service," 
Public Administration Review, vol- 27, no. 3, 1967, pp.200-201. Quoted by Aaron Wil- 
davsky, "Rescuing Policy Analysis From PPBS," Public Administration Review, vol. 
29, no. 2, 1969, pp. 189-202. This paper by Wildavsky, and his earlier essay, "The Polit- 
ical Eccnom y of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program 
Budgeting," Public Administrction Review, vol. 26, no. 6, pp.292-310, probably 
represent the most influential criticism of systems analysis by a political scientist. 
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The immediate practical question is, how can political and institutional con- 
siderations be handled with the same professional competence as the more familiar 
technical and economic factors. One possibility is suggested by the notion of "politicd 
feasibilitym-a notion that is used frequently, if loosely, in policy discussions T o  take pol- 
itical feasibility seriously means to be prepared to list the specific political and institution- 
al constraints that limit the freedm of choice of the policy makers.% Once these con- 
straints have been made explicit, it will often be possible to estimate the consequences of 
small variations on the cost of achieving the policy objectives. In this way, a rough esti- 
mate of the opportunity costs of a political constraint can be obtained.39 Suppose, for ex- 
ample, that a publicly-owned oil company is considering where to locate a new refinery. 
If government policy forces the company to build the plant in a part of the country in 
need of special economic assistance, the implied cost of this political constraint can be 
evaluated by reference to a situation in which the constraint was not present. 
As long as policy analysis is conceived as systems analysis writ large, the role 
of the political analyst is entirely analogous to thaf of the economist or of the technical 
expert: he translates his assessment of the political situation into a set of constraints and, 
together with other specialists, estimates the consequences of those constraints for the ex- 
pected level of achievement of the policy objectives 
The second direction in which a differentiation between systems analysis and 
policy analysis has been sought is quite different, since it emphasizes the process rather 
than the outputs or outcomes of policy making. Here the analyst is viewed less as a 
problem-solver or advisor than as designer of procedures fur gruup decisionrrlaking, and 
as a catalyst in the implementation process. The advocates of this process-oriented view 
38~iandomenico Majone, "On the Nnicn of Political Feasibility." European Journal of 
Political Research, vol. 3, 1975, pp.259-274; now in Polig Studies Review Annual, vol. 
Stuart S. Nagel, editor, Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1977. 
"Giandomenico Majone, T h e  Feasibility of Sacial Policies," Pdic j  Sciences, "01. 6, 
1975, pp.49-69 and Alan Williams, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: Bastard Science? And/or  
Insidious Poison in the Body Politick?", cit. 
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of analysis are impressed by the enormous complexity of policy making, and by the 
cognitive and information-processing limitations of the human mind. This  lack of match 
between intellectual capacity and the complexity of social processes dooms to failurz any 
attempt to find complete and explicit solutions to policy problems Policy protlen-IS are 
never solved, but only shifted and (sometimes) ameliorated. O r ,  rather, to the extent 
that a policy problem is temporarily resolved (i.e., removed from the agenda of lssues 
under current debate), this happens because a consensus has been reached by the partici- 
panu in the policy process, not because a solution, in the sense of normative analysis, has 
been found. But if policy problems are resolved by social interactions (bargaining, de- 
centralized markets, voting, persuasion, and so on), what role is left for policy analysts to 
play? 
Charles Lindblom, whose writings represent the most articulate and influen- 
tial expression of the process-oriented approach, recognizes three distinct forms of adap- 
tation of analysis to interaction: 40 
O n e  is analysis by any participant of how he can play his interactive role 
better to get what he wants--frankly partisan analysis asking W h a t  shall I buy?' or 
"How shall I vote?" or (for a businessman) "How can I increase sales?" or (for a legisla- 
tor) "How can I get this bill through the House?' T h e  second is analysis d how to enter 
into existing interactions most successfully to achieve some public purpose which one, as a 
public official, has a responsibility to pursue. "Should taxes be cut to stimulate employ- 
ment?" Should criminal penalties for street crime be increased?' The third is analysis 
of possible changes in the basic structure of the interaction processes themselves. Should 
markets be made more competitive by breaking up big business?" Should the criminal 
justice system be revamped? W h a t  changes are required in parliamentary organiza- 
tions?. 
Notice how the three kinds of adaptation roughly correspond to the historical 
development of ASA,  from the early applications of operations research to specific prob- 
lems of t ~ t i ~  mnd logistics, through the broader. concerns of systems aidysis, to the 
preoccupation with institutional reform which characterizes contemporary policy analysis. 
Probably the most important inaght to emerge from a serious retlection on this develop- 
tOChKle,r. Lindblom. Politics And Marketl. New Y ork: Basic Books, Inc., 1977, 
p.316. See also D. Braybrooke and C.E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, New York: 
Free Press, 1963. 
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ment is the recognition that analysis has a praedural as well as a substantive hnction. 
It provides not only evidence and arguments, but also an intellectual structure for the 
policy process. Even when its conclusions are not accepted, its categories and language, 
its rational ordering of general ideas affect-even condition-the policy debate. The  im- 
portance of this procedural function is directly related to the basic lack of certainty of 
policy determinations. When the correctness of a decision can be established unambigu- 
ously, the manner in which it is reached is largely immaterial; only results count. But 
when the factual and value premises are uncertain and controversial, when objective cri- 
teria of success or failure are lacking, the formal characteristics of the decision process- 
its procedure-become significant. Harvey Brooks draws a revealing analogy between 
analysis and legal procedures: 4 1 
The usefulness of systems analysis depends on the fact that its conclusions 
purport to be based on a set of neutral principles that command a wider consensus than 
those conclusions themselves would be likely to command without a demonstration that 
they are logically deducible from such principles. In this sense, policy or systems analysis 
perform a function with respect to political-technological decisions similar to that per- 
formed by a judicial process with respect to conflicts between individuals A court deci- 
sion is accepted by the disputing parties largely because it is based on a set of rules both 
parties accept applied through a procedure which both parties are prepared, before 
knowing its outcome. to accept as unbiased. 
One does not have to agree with Brooks that analytical conclusions can be 
formally deduced, more gemetrico, from a set of "neutral principles,' to recognize the 
importance of his observations In our societies the rationality and legitimacy of public 
policies depend increasingly on procedural, even more than on substantive, considerations. 
But for analysis to perform a quasi-judicial function with respect to policy decisions, its 
own rules of svidence and procedure must be spelled out in great detail. As I shall ar- 
gue i n  the second part of this chapter, this calls for a determtirrrd effort by the ASA pro- 
fession to develop standards of adequacy and suitable mechanisms of quality control 
4 1 ~ a r v e y  Brooks, Tnvironrnental Decision Making: Analysis and Values,' in W h m  
Vdues Conflict, L.H. Tribe, C.S. Schelling, and J. Voss, editors, Cambridge, Mas- 
sachusettr Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976, pp. 11 5-136, 1 1 5. 
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4. ... A N D  BACK TO O P E R A T I O N S  RESEARCH 
I shall attempt to summarize the preceding discussi~n by exhibiting in tabular 
forn-I the distinguishing features and characteristic problems of the three stages of ASA, 
as shown in Table 1. 12 
At this point, two ciarifications are necessary to avoid misunderstandings. 
First, the terminological distinctions among operations research, systems analysis, and pol- 
icy analysis, while fairly common in English-speaking countries (but not without some 
ambiguities even there: where, for instanre, does management science fit in the series?), 
are by no means universally accepted or used. In many countries a single label llke 
"operations research" applies to all three stages or forms of analysis that have been dis- 
tinguished here. In such a case, moperations researchm assumes exactly the same meaning 
as 'applied systems analysis," as the term has been used in this chapter. 
Second, it is important to realize that a classification like the one suggested by 
the above table is only a cross-section or time-slice of the entire process of disciplinary 
evolution. T o  obtain a complete evolutionary representation one would have to combine a 
crass-sectional description with a longitudinal study. Such a cross-sectional and longitu- 
dinal study of operations research, for example, would show not only the successive 
chanps  in the pool of concepts and techniques available at diff~rpnt  points in time, but 
also a continuous evolution in aims, methods, and evaluative criteria (ir! short, in the 
self-image of the discipline) reflecting, at least in part, andogous developments in systems 
and policy analysis. Iristead of a linear development, in which systems analysis follows 
operations research and is followed by policy analysis-a linear order which has teen 
adopted here only for expository reasons-what we have in fact is a diaiectical sequence 
 his table expands an analogous clanification proposed by Roger E Levien in nOut- 
cane  Measurement: A U.S. Viewpoint," unpublished manuscript, IIASA, 1980. 
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systems ; micr~ec~ncmics; 
cons trained optimization; 
decision and game theory 
simulation; eoonoltletrics. 
Public policy making; ill- 
defined goals; institutional 
framework given; public 
finance and political eoonany; 
organization theory; data 
analysis and large-scale 
social experimentation. 
Typical 
applica t ions 
Tactical operations; 
logistics; production 
scheduling; waiting lines; 
inventory control; 
programming. 
Choice among weapon 
systems; strategic 
studies; resource allo- 
cation in a national 
health system; develop- 
mentofwater resources. 
Policy planning; reform of 
existing national systems 
of health, education, or 
social security; pollution 
control; program evaluation; 
program implementation. 
Table 1. Distinguishing features and characteristic problems 
at three stages of applied systems analysis. 
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in which different modes of analysis coexist in more or less close mutual interaction. 
Thus, in recent issues of journals like Operations Research and hfanugement Science 
one finds articles on air-pollution control and water quality management, on majority 
voting and distributional constraints on public expenditure p l ~ ~ ~ i i t i g ,  oti evaluadon of 
quality of social services and implementation of new ideas in bureaucracies, on decision 
analysis and medical malpractice, even on design of electoral districts-topics and papers 
that could have appeared also in Pdicy Sciences, Policy Analysis, or some economics 
journal. 
It has already been noted that the most important factor tying the different 
specializations and approaches of ASA together is the way in which an initial problem 
develops and mixes with other issues to form a lattice" of descendant problems. Energy 
policy modeling is a good example of this phenomenon. The  first energy models 
developed in the early 1970s dealt la re ly  with technical and economic issues that could 
be handled by standard O R  methodologies. There were short- and medium-term 
linear programming models of energy supplies. and econometric models of energy 
demands; quadratic programming models of price-responsive oil demands and supplies, 
and the resulting international equilibrium; year-by-year simulations of electric utilities 
pricing and equipment-ordering policies, and so on? T h e  omission of social, political, 
and institutional considerations-health and environmental effects nf different modes of 
energy production, safety problems, the risk of nuclear proliferation, issues of "scale" and 
of the political implications of alternative energy paths-did not appear to be too serious 
in the early stages of the policy debate. But as opinions have become pijlarized md piib- 
lic appreciation of the mure remote implications of pulic)i choices has iticreued, the r~eed 
to deal explicitly also with the broader social and political issues has been generally ac- 
cepted by the modeling community. After years of rather fruitless debate, even the most 
'!%or a very useful recent survey, see Alan S. Manne, Richard G. Richels, and John P. 
Weyant, "Energy Policy Modeling. A Survey,' Operations Research, voL 27, no. 1, 
January-February 1979, pp.1-36. 
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technically-minded analysts have been forced to recognize that technology and econom- 
ics can play only a limited role in the ongoing energy controversy, and that energy policy 
is inherently an interdisciplinary field. "It involves economics, law, politic& engineering, 
resource geology, biomedical impacts, and environmentd risk assesm~ent-along with the 
methodologies that are already familiar to the operations researcher: optimization algo- 
rithms, nmulations, decision analysis and econometric estimation. "44 
T h e  case of energy policy modeling raises another issue of the utmost impor- 
tance today for all applied systems analysts: the role and effectiveness of formal analysis 
in the policy process. But this takes us beyond the strictly disciplinary aspects of the 
evolution of ASA, and into the professional and socio-institutional dimensions to which 
we now tu rn  
5. T H E  SOCLAL SIDE O F  ASA: PROFESSIONAL A N D  
I N S T I T U T I O N A L  D E V E L O P M E N T S  
T h e  preceding sections have largely dealt with the "internal history" of 
ASA-the development of concepts, methods, and techniques in response to the changing 
nature of the objects of inquiry, and to intellectual challenges arising within the profes- 
sion. This intellectual development must now be related to the 1a.rger social context in 
which analysts operate. T h e  questinn to be investigated now is how the historical 
development of institutions and roles, publications and incentive systems both reflect and 
influence the intellectual concerns and aspirations of the ASA profession. 
It has already been suggested that neither approach-internal, intellectual his- 
tury on the one haid,  external, social history, un the uiher-is by itself sufficient tu give 
an adequate account of the entire development of the field. Social or institutional factors 
do not explain, for example, the cycles of expansion and depression experienced by cer- 
tain areas of reearch and application, s1.1ch as game theory. On thp nther hand, nationa.1 
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differences in style and i m s  of ASA activity cannot be explained only, or even pri- 
marily, on intellectual grounds. Thug the fact that industrial operations research in the 
United States has adopted quite early a systems approach, has been attributed to the 
high degree of specialization and professionalization of applied industrial research in that 
country. At the time the operations researchers arrived on the scene (the first public 
meeting between operations researchers and industrial managers took place only in 1951, 
in Cleveland) industrial engineering, statistical quality control, marketing, personnel and 
financial management, were already recognized fields of professional specialization. 
Hence. according to this theory, in order to define a field of cognitive exclusiveness, 
American operations researchers had to focus on the interactions of specific industrial 
Functions and the organization as a whole41 One need not agree fully with the explana- 
tion to recognize that the factors involved are institutional rather than disciplinary. 
Similarly, the relatively late development of academic operations research in Europe, as 
well as the difficulty of establishing academic curricula in policy analysis, are largely due 
to institutional and sociological differences existing between European and American 
university systems. 
At this point some chronology may be helpful. The first O R professional so- 
ciety was formed in the United Kingdom in 1948 as the Operational Research Society 
(initially. Operational Research Club). The Operations Research S ~ i e t y  nf America 
followed in 1952, with Philip M. Morse as its first president. The initial membership of 
both societies included many scientists who had taken part in the development of mili- 
tary O R  during World War 2. However, the focus of professional interest wzis rapidly 
shifting to irldustrial applications. One sign of [his redirection of professional iiiterests is 
the foundation in 1953 of The Institute of Management Sciences-an internationai society. 
but with mast of its members in the United States In 1957, the first International 
Conference on Operational Research was held at Oxford University. It was attended 
4 5 ~ ~ .  Ackoff, .A Comparison of Operational Research in the U.S.A. and in Great 
Britain,' Operufiond Research Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2, June 1957, pp.88-100. 
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but with most of its members in the United States. In 1957, the first International 
Conference on Operational Research was held at Oxford University. It was attended 
by 250 delegates from 21 countries. One important outcome of this conference was the 
International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS), formally constituted 
on January 1, 1959, with three initial members: Operational Research Society, Opera- 
tions Research Society of America, and ~oci%C Fran$aise de Recherche ~~dra t ione l le  
(founded in 1956).# Between 1959 and 1975, twenty-four additional national societies 
were founded in Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, Australia, and 
South Africa, and soon joined IFORS. 
Operations research journals closely follow the developmental pattern of pro- 
fessional societies, starting with Operational Resecnch Quarterly, founded in 1950 and 
published by the U.K. Operational Research Society, and Operations Research (1952), 
published by the Operations Research Society of America In all fields of learning, 
scholarly periodicals are among the most powerful institutions of science, and ASA is no 
exception in this respect. In fact, if it is true that even in the older natural sciences "the 
very raison d'ztre of many scientific societies lies primarily in the journals they sponsor, 
only secondarily in their formal  meeting^,^' in the case of ASA professional journals 
sometimes take the place of professional societies. For instance, while no professional so- 
cieties yet exist in the field of policy analysis, policy analysts in government, universities, 
and research institutes tend to gravitate intellectually toward publications like Policy 
Sciences, founded in 1970, and Policy Analysis, founded in 1975. In these cases, the 
lack of a sponsoring professional organization is com pensated, to some extent, by the 
presence of very luge (by usud s ta t id~ds)  editorial boards 
%or additional information and bibliographical reference% see the useful article by 
Hugh J. Miser, "The History, Nature, and Use of Operations Research," in Handbook 
of Operations Research, Joseph J .  Moder and Salah E. Elmaghraby, editors, New York: 
V n Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1978, vol. 1, pp.3-24. 
"Stephen Toulrnin, op. cit., p.2'70. 
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interactions between producers and consumers of analyds, as well as between the vari- 
ous divisions and professional groups within the ASA community. Perhaps the best 
known exemplar of this literature is Interfaces, published since 1971 by The Institute of 
Mmagvment Sciences (originally under tho title T h e  Bulletin). 
Having stressed the role played by journals in the disciplinary and profes- 
sional development of ASA, it is important to note also some oftheir problems and llrni- 
tations. The first problem, mentioned here only briefly, since it will be discussed in the 
next section, is that of the critical criteria used in the refereeing process How to recon- 
cile rigor with relevance is the crucial difficulty. The desire for rigor, especially in the 
highly specialized sense of formal or axiomatic rigor in which the term is often used, 
may (and often does) prevail over the requirements of relevance. In the trend toward 
greater formalization some critics see the possibility that ASA may lose its identity and 
be assimilated into other fields of inquiry. 48 
A second difficulty in assessing the state of ASA through professional publi- 
cations is that journals and research reports tend to give a distorted picture of the 
field-a picture which is strongly biased in the direction of theoretical developments. For 
security, proprietary, or other reasons actual applications are not published, or may ap- 
pear in print with a delay of years. Thus  one of the mast famous studies in military sys- 
tems analysis, the S t r a t g c  B m s  Study conducted by Albert Wohlstetter and other 
Rand analysts. was initiated in 1951. completed in 1954, declassified in 1962. md dis- 
cussed in a professional journal only in 1964:' Even when actual case studies are re- 
ported, the necessity of concealing the identity of the sponsor and the true nature of the 
problen-I investigated d e n  induces a stylized presentation in which nia-17 of t h e  details 
that are 90 important for understanding the craft aspects of ASA are completely lost. 
%or a recent expression of this view, see Seth Bonder, 'Changing the Future of 
Operations Research," Operations Research, vol. 27, no. 2, March-April 1979, pp.209- 
'ice Bruce LR. Smith, T h e  RAND Corporation, Cambridge, ~ &achuse t t r  Har- 
- 
vard University Press, 1966, pp.195-240. 
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Next to journals, standard textbooks represent an important locus of scientific 
authority, and the main channel by which the intellectual advances of a discipline be- 
come the collective property of a profession. 
Whereas the "micro-evolution' of scientific ideas is manifested in the most 
up-to-date research discussions ... its "macro-evolution" is embodied in the standard texts 
accepted as authoritative in each successive generation., . [Tlhese standard works de- 
fine the successive bodies of doctrine that form the accepted starting-points for the next 
generation. By digesting the specialized literature of the preceding generation, indeed, 
these comprehensive expositions create a 'conceptual platform" on which the next gen- 
eration of buddi~scient is ts  can stand firm, in defining and attacking their own disci- 
plinary problems. 
The  successive stages of development (sf ASA are clearly marked by a series 
of distinguished texts, starting with Morse and Kimball's Methods of Operations 
Research, issued as a classified technical report in 1946 and published commercially five 
years later. A comparison of the table of contents of this text with that of the influential 
5 1 Infroduction to Operations Research by West Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff, pub- 
M e d  in 1957, reveals graphically the shifc of professional interests from military to in- 
dustrial problems, as well as the emergence of new (or rediscovered) analytic methods 
like queuing and inventory theory, linear programming, and game theory. 
This first post-War textbook in operations research has been followed by 
scores of texts, treatises, and reference works now appearing with increasing frequency in 
all industrialized countries. The  award in 1969 of the Lanchester Prize of the Opera- 
tions Research Society of America to Harvey Wagner's Principles of Operations 
Resemch is another indication of the professional significance of an outstanding didactic 
work. The sheer size of Wagner's book is evidence of the number of ideas and methods 
that were sufficiently well developed and tested by the end of the 1960s to be expounded 
in an introductory presentation of basic principles. Yet the differences from earlier 
works like the West Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoffs Introduction, are not merely 
I0stephen Toulmin. Human Vndnstanding, ciL, pp.277-278. 
5 1 ~ .  West Churchman, Russell L. Ackoff, and E. Leonard Arnoff, Introduction :G 
Operations Research, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1957. 
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quantitative. As an interesting example of the process of conceptual selection referred 
to previously, I may mention the fact that game theory, which received chapter-length 
treatment in the Introduction, is omitted in Wagner's Primiples, except for the 
minimax theorem of two-person, zero-sum games-rdgated to an exercise in the 
chapter on dua1ity.l 
Again, while the earlier Introduction grew from lecture material prepared 
for short courses in operations research, Wagner's text reflects a stage of development in 
which undergraduate and graduate courses in operations research form a well- 
eseablished component of academic curricula in business, economics, engineering, and 
public administration. 
No comparable standard presentations of systems analysis exist, but Hitch 
and McKean's The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (published in 1960) 
represents nevertheless a milestone in the evolution of ASA. While the title and many of 
the examples in the text refer to military applications, the underlying philosophy is com- 
pletely general As the authors write, 53 
[ih this book we will be concerned with economics in its mosf general sense. 
Economics is not exclusively concerned ,. with certain types of activities (industrial) 
rather than others (military), or with the traditional points of view of budgeteers and 
comptrollers. Being truly economical does not mean scrimping-reducing expenditures 
no matter how important the things to be bought. Nor does it mean implementing some 
stated doctrine regardless of cost. Rather economics is concerned with allocating 
resources--ch&ng doctrines and techniques-so as to get the most out of available 
resources 
5 2 ~ h i s  omission corresponds to the judgment often, if not so caustically, expressed in 
professional circles that Tiln practicing operations research, we have found that game 
theory does not contribute any managerid insights to real competitive and cooperative 
decision-making behavior that are not dreudy familiar to church-going poker players 
who regularly read the Wall Street Journalm See Harvey M. Wagner, Prinaples of 
Ofiratfm Research. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1975. 2nd edi- 
tion, p.XI. This should be compared with the opinion expressed some twenty years ear- 
lier by Ackoff and co-authors (op. at, p.519), that game theory "started a new way of 
Inking about competitive decisions.' 
'Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in  the Nuclear 
Age, cit, pp.1-2. Footnote omitted. 
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The Economics of Defense is the intellectual product of an institution, the 
Rand Corporation, whose name stands for one of the most influential "rchools" of systems 
analysis, and whase organization and style of work have been imitated throughout the 
world. T h e  history of the institution in its most creative period is well documented, and 
need not be retold here.% However, the history of Rand raises an issue of organ~zational 
design for policy research institutes which is too central to our discussion to be ignored. 
Why was the nongovernmental, nonprofit form of organization chosen for Rand and for 
other policy research institutes like Resources for the Future, the Stanford Research In- 
stitute, the Brookings Institution, and, more recently, the International Institute for Ap- 
plied Systems Analysis? Other  institutional solutions were, after all, possible-as part of 
the government staff, or of a university, or as a (for profit) consulting firm. But each of 
these alternatives presents serious disadvantages for the kind of work-medium to long 
range, multidisciplinary, independent, and objective-that a high-level policy research in- 
stitute is supposed to do.55 Research carried out by government agencies tends to be of a 
narrow and short-run nature because the problems immediately facing such agencies are 
typically narrow and short-run. Also, the incentive structure of large bureaucracies does 
not favor independent opinions and serious efforts at deep understanding. Blackett, it 
may b~ recalled, had argued that the atmosphere required for an op~ra t ims  research 
group 'is that of a first-class pure scientific research institution, and the caliber of the 
personnel should match thisms This  stems to suggest the university as a suitable en- 
vironment for ASA activities. Unfortunately, universities are structured largely along 
disciplinary lines, mind the cost of break.ing down those lilies ir-I order to attack policy 
problems (which by their very nature cut acrass disciplinary boundaries) can be prohibi- 
1 4 ~ r u c e  LR. Smith, The RAND Corporation, cit. 
5 5 ~ o r  a related discussion, see William G o r h m ,  W h y  Policy Restarch Institutes?", 
IIASA Research Memorandum 7556, November 1975, and Bruce L.R. Smith, cit., 
 MS. Blackett, op. cit-, p.175. 
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tively high. Again, the incentive system of the university, with its emphasis on publica- 
tion in specialized journals and on peer recognition, is not conducive to policy-relevant 
research. Finally, an organization operating for profit is dependent on the financial sup- 
port of its clients and consequently tends to concentrate on short-run and limited prob- 
l e m ~  like in-house government policy research. And since, in addition, a consulting firm 
must show mconcrete resultsw to justify its fee, it wll tend to look at the more easily quan- 
tifiable aspects of policy problems, where standard tools and techniques can be directly 
applied. 
The nongovernmental, nonprofit form of organization has emerged as a 
response to the failure of other institutional arrangements to provide a congenial atmo- 
sphere for carrying out fundamental, independent, multidisciplinary policy research. 
This is not to say that the results have been uniformly good. In fact, nonprofit institu- 
tions present their own characteristic problems and dangers. T o  a large extent, these are 
related to the lack of generally accepted criteria for evaluating their performance, and to 
the ever-present possibility of conflict between professional excellence and practical ef- 
fectiveness. These issues will be discussed in the next section. 
6. T HE EVOLUTION OF CRTTERTA OF QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
The existence of suitable mechanisms of quality control is on& d the distin- 
guishing features of a well-established profession. Professional quality controls fulfill a 
double function: an internal one, to ensure adherence to group expectations about perfor- 
mance by members of the profession; and an external one, to ensure that the users of 
professional services can rely on their being of an acceptable quality. Ideally, the two 
functions, and the corresponding criteria, should integrate and support each other. In 
practice conflicts can and do arise, especially in the case of young professions like ASA, 
and then it is not clear which function should prevail. General pre.scripti.ons are useless, 
and only a detailed knowledge of the current stage and historical development of the 
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profession can suggest sensible compromises 
Naturally, the importance of quality standards has been recognized since the 
beginning of ASA. Some of the citations given in previous sections from Blackett's early 
memormda show this quite clearly; and the charter of the Operatioris Research Society 
of America nates as one of the purposes of the society 'the establishment and mainte- 
nance of professional standards of competence for work known as operations research." 
But for many years the issue of quality standards remained dormant, only to explode in 
the early 1970s-in a form for which the analytic profession was intellectually 
unprepared. A knowledge of these developments is helpful for understanding the nature 
of ASA as an intellectual craft, and its evolution. 
T h e  first practitioners of operations research had little doubt that what they 
were doing was scientific in character, despite the differences in the objects of inquiry- 
military operations or, more generally, man-machine systems-from those of traditional 
scientific research. T h e  main goal of operations research was "to find a scientific expla- 
nation of the facts" For, as C.H. Waddington explains, Tolnly when this is done can the 
two main objects of operational research be attained. These are the prediction of the ef- 
fects of new weapons and of new tacticsd7 According m Blackett's crisp formulation, 
"[olperational staff provide the scientists with the operational outlook and da.ta T h e  
scientists apply scientific methods of analysis to these data, and are thus able to give use- 
ful advice."58 
Sirnilzirly, in the definition of O R  adopted by the Operational Research So- 
ciety of Britain, the word "science" or "scientific" occurs three times. Operations 
research b proclaimed to be the application of the m e t h d s  of science to complex prob- 
lems; a discipline whose distinctive approach is the development of a scientific model of 
the system bemg analyzed, and whose purpose is to help management determine ~ t s  policy 
and actions scientifically, 
5 7 ~ . ~ .  Waddington, OR in World War 2, London: ELEK Science Ltd.. 1973, p.26. 
%.MS. Blackett. Studirr of Wm. cit.. p.171. 
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Glven this paradigm, the relevant standards of quality are those of the na- 
tural sciences In fact, the situations investigated by operations researchers during the 
War fit the paradigm quite well. Typically, military operations could be regarded as 
representative of a class of repetitive situations "where theories built up in response to 
earlier examples of the situation could be checked out against later examples, monitored 
while proposals for improved action were in use, and used to detect their own dwindling 
validity as the situations changed.'59 The first industrial applications of the post-War 
period presented many of the same features and, as in the case of Leslie C. Edie's 
Traffic Delays at Toll Booths,' explicitly appealed to the same scientific criteria of 
evaluation and criticism. 
Another important characteristic which early industrial O R  shared with mil- 
itary O R  was a reasonable clarity in the definition of the roles of analysts and decision- 
makers. Whether the users of analysis were high-level officers or high-level managers, 
analysis was done primarily, and often (because of the requirements of military or indus- 
trial secrecy) exclusively, for them. The analyst did not have to address himself to any 
audience other than the decisionmaker, or a small group of decisionmakers, who had 
commissioned the study. Problems of implementation could be safely assumed to be the 
responsibility of a well4efind hierarchical authority, and the same authority could es- 
tablish, if not standards of quality, at least criteria of effectiveness 
Already in the early 1950s all this was changing, at an increasingly rapid 
rate. Changes in personnel were accompanied by changes in the nature of the problems 
atialysts were investigating. and in the institutional context in which analysis was done. 
As natural scientists like Blackett. Waddington, and Morse were returning to their 
university departments and laboratories, the new generation of analysts entering the 
profession-mathematicians, logicians, statisticians, contrnl theorists-was more interested 
5%plton Boothroyd, Articulate Inf eruenfim, cit., p. 1 13. 
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in the formal aspects of scientific research, and often lacked the craft skills and the 
maturity of critical judgment of the old masters.60 At the same time, the problems 
claiming analytic attention were becoming more abstract and complex. Strategic issues, 
whether in business w government, loomed increasingly irr~prtiu~t on the frontier of pro- 
fessional thinking and practice. Subjective uncertainty was seen to be much more crucial 
than statistical regularities or deterministic models And the increasing role played by 
ASA in the public sector meant that analysts-no longer discreet advisors to the prince, 
but actors in a political process in which advocacy and persuasion could not be neatly 
separated from objective analysis-had to pay attention to questions of equity, and of in- 
stitutional feasibility. The high uncertainty surrounding strategic problems, the long 
times needed to implement a proposed solution also meant that direct empirical verifica- 
tion of analytic conclusions was often impossible. If in 1953, George E. Kimball could 
still say of operations research that: 61 
It is based on the conviction that the factors affecting ... operations can be 
measured quantitatively and that there exist common laws obeyed by the bzsic vari- 
ables ... . The  main problems concerning operations research today are the discovery of 
such laws and the development of techniques ,. for rapid, simple application ... 
his younger colleagues were increasingly skeptical about the possibility of discovering 
l a w s  of operations," and whether, indeed, the discovery of laws was a meaningful pro- 
fessional aim. At the time Kimball was writing, the move away from description (and 
generalization) to prescription as the hallmark of the systems analyst was. already clearly 
discernible. 
5- now a new generation of officers and analysts has come on the scene, many of 
whom have never had the sobering experience of seeing their opt:irnistic predictions 
disproved by deaths on the battlefield. They too often a n  wiliing to take the assunip- 
tions given them by designers and by 'intelligence' as gospel truth, and to base their cal- 
culations on them without adding any correction factors for 'the fog of war'." Philip M. 
Morse, Letter to the Editor, Operations Research, vol. 20, no. 1, January-February 
1972, pp.239-242, 240. 
6 1 ~ eo r ge  E. Kirnball. "A Philosophy of Operations Reaarch,' Abstract, Operations 
Research, vol. 1, 1953, p.145, cited in Harvey M. Wagner, 'The ABC's of OR," Opera- 
tions Research, voL 19, no. 6, October 1971, pp.1259- 128 1. 
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Now, the implications of these developments for the search for professional 
standards of quality are quite far-reaching. If it is no longer possible to believe in the 
objective validity of the conclusions of an analytic study, and if even the criteria of suc- 
cess of the decision it supports are ambiguous, then evaluation by results becomes mean- 
ingless, and must be replaced by such process-oriented criteria as internal consistency 
and professional (or even political) consensus. 
The shift toward process-riented evaluation is quite visible in the list of 13 
criteria worked out by the Lanchester Prize Committee in 1957 in order to supplement 
the broad, but not very operational, guidelines adopted by the preceding committees. 62 
However, the issue of professional standards for ASA came truly alive only in 1971, 
with the publication of 'Guidelines for the Practice of Operations Researchm prepared 
by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Operations Research Society of ~ m e r i c a ~ ~  The par- 
ticular controversy that led to the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee does not concern 
us here, except for the fact that in that controversy well-known analysts, applying stan- 
dard technical tools to the same policy issues, had come to opposite conclusions and 
recommendations. The primary concern of the Committee was, in the words of the 
President of the Society, 'the professional conduct of the debate, the quality of the argu- 
mentation, the adherence to established study procedl~res in operations research and sys- 
tems analysis. 6 4  
Unfortunately, most comments on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee were 
directed at an Appendix where the behavior of some of the participants in the substan- 
tive debate had been severely castigated. With a few notable exceptionsb5 the Guide- 
"see Report of the Lanchester P m  Committee. Operations Research, vol. 5, no. 4, 
August 1957, pp.57 5-578. 
6 S ~ p n o ~ i o n r  Reseurch, vol. 19. no. 5, September 197 1, pp. 1 123-1 148. 
@bid., p 1 123. 
'%wo such exrepticas are Harvey M. Wagner, 'Commenruy m ORSA Guidelines," 
and Ian I. Mitroff, T h e  Myth of Objectivity or Why Science Needs a New Psychology 
of Science,' both in Manugement Saence, vol. 18, no. 10, June 1972. pp. B-609 to B- 
613. and B-613 to B-618, respectively. 
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lines themselves received little attention, aside from some cursory remarks on their in- 
nocuous, if laudable. character. This  is indeed a pity, for the ASA profession could have 
greatly benefited from a critical examination of the specific standards proposed, and of 
the outdared philosophy of science on which they rated.  T h e  phiiosophy of the report 
gives great emphasis to two dichotomies: 'pure' and "applied' science on the one hand, 
and "analysis" versus "advocacy" on the other. I shall now brietly indlcate why these 
distinctions are irrelevant, if not positively misleading, in the context of a discussion of 
66 professional practice. 
T o  begin with, the most significant similarities between science and ASA are 
to be found not in the outcome, but in the process of research, more precisely, in the craft 
aspects common to all forms of disciplined intellectual inquiry. T h e  actual work of the 
scientist requires knowledge that is aqui red  only through practice and precept and 
which therefore is not scientific in character. This  craft knowledge is a repertoire of 
procedures and judgments thaf are partly personal, partly social. Thus, when a scientist 
decides whether a batch of data is  of acceptable quality, he applies standards that derive 
from his own experience, but also reflect the professional norms of his teachers and col- 
leagues, as well as culturally determined criteria of adequacy. Personal and social judg- 
ments are also involved in data manipulation, in the choice of tools and models, in the 
selection of evidence, and in the construction of an argument. 
T h e  importance of craft knowledge and experience is even greater in ASA. 
Because the conclusions of a systems study cannot be proved in the sense in which a 
theorem is proved, or even in the manner in which propositions of natural science are es- 
tablished, they must satisfy gkr~erally accepted criteria of adrquacg. Such criteria are 
derived not from abstract logical canons (the rules of the mythical "scientific method") 
but from craft experience, depending as they do on the special features of the problem. 
-- 
%or more detailed arguments, see Giandomenico Maione, "Policies as Theories,' Ome- 
ga, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, pp.151-162, and "The Craft o fhppl ied  Systems Analysis," Lax- 
enburg, Austria, forthcoming, as well as the papers by Wagner and Mitroff cited in the 
preceding footnote. 
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on the quality of the data and limitations of the available tools, on the time constraints 
imposed on the analysts, and on the requirements of the sponsor andlor decisionmaker. 
In short, craft knowledge-less explicit than formalized theoretical knowledge, 
but rrlore objective than pure intuition-is essential for doing systems analysis as well as 
for evaluating it. Not artificial distinctions between pure and applied science, between 
analysis and advocacy, but close attention to the fine structure of the analyst's task is 
what is required for serious evaluation. This structure can be described in terms of 
categories like data, information, tools, evidence, and argument that are applicable to any 
type and style of analysis, retrospective as well as prospective, descriptive as well as 
prescriptive, argumentative as well as "scientific." Take, for example, the category "evi- 
dence." Evidence is not synonymous with data or information; it is information selected 
from the available stock and introduced at a specific point in the argument in order to 
persuade a particular audience of the truth or falsity of a statement. Selecting inap- 
propriate data or models, placing them at the wrong point in an argument, or choosing a 
style of presentation which is not appropriate for the intended audience, can destroy the 
effectiveness of information used as evidence, regardless of its intrinsic cognitive value. 
Hence, criteria for assessing evidence must be different from those for assessing "facts" 
Facts can be evaluated in terms of standard scientific criteria, but evidence must be 
evaluated in accordance with a number of factors peculiar to a given situation, such as 
the specific nature of the case, the type of audience, the prevailing "rules of evidence" 
(including, of course, all relevant scientific rules), and even the persuasiveness of the 
analyst. Thus the assessment of the quality of the evidence presented in an analytic 
study is a n-~icrocom-I of the complex social process of evaluatiuti iti which scientific and 
extra-scientific. objective and advocacy elements are inextricably intertwined. 
Analogous problems arise in evaluating the practical effectiveness of ASA 
studies. Unlike the analyses of military operations cnnductd in war-time, and snmc 
small-scale industrial applications, it is extremely difficult, as already mentioned, to 
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evaluate the usefulness of large-xale policy studies in terms of actual results produced. 
This is due to a number of reasons. First, the long time lag between the adoption of a 
policy recommendati~n and its actual implementation. Second, the difficulty of sorting 
out the effects of a particular decision from among a multitude of confounding factors. 
Third, and most important, the social and institutional context in which systems analysis 
is done has changed dramatically in the last two decades. In the early days the relation- 
ship between decisionmaker and advisor, between producer and user of analysis was 
much clearer than it is today. This is still reflected in the ORSA "Guidelines for the 
Practice of Operations Research,' though the description given there of the dient- 
analyst relationship was probably already outdated at the time the Guidelines were pub- 
lished. Now it is quite common for policy research to be sponsored by one organization, 
carried out by another, utilized by a third organization, and perhaps evaluated by yet 
another agency (which, in turn, may 'commission the evaluation to an independent 
research group). Clearly, the criteria of effectiveness of the sponsors are not the same as 
those of the users, or of the controllers. Thus the analyst must attempt to satisfy a 
number of different, sometimes conflicting, expectations. The  best he can do is to 
achieve some acceptable level of adequacy in each direction: he must "satisfice,' rather 
than maximize any one particular criterion. Actually, the situation is even more complex 
than this, for many policy studies in fields like energy, risk assessment, or education are 
'designed to influence congressional debates and to affect the climate of public opinion, 
not to guide decisions within individual corpmationrd7 The effectiveness of such ana- 
lyses can only be measured in terms of their impact on the ongoing policy debate: their 
success in clarifying issues, in introducing new concepts and viewpoints, even in modify- 
ing people's perceptions of the problem. Here analysis is no longer separable from social 
interaction as a problem-solving device, but beconles an integral part of the process by 
which plrblic issues are raised, debated, and In fact, the historical develop- 
6'~1an S. Manne, Richard G. Richels, and John P. Weyant. "Energy Policy Modeling: 
A Survey,' cit., pp. 1-2. 
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ment of ASA provides additional evidence for the truth of the statement that "creation 
of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very 
often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without 
brirrging the process to a stop. 6 9  
In the following, concluding section of this chapter it will be argued that the 
unavoidable complexity of the language of systems analysis reflects the fundamental dlf- 
ficulty of separating ideas from action. 
7. CONCLUSION: T H E  LANGUAGE O F  ASA 
As the preceding pages show, the question: How scientific is systems analysis? 
(or operations research, or management science), keeps recurring throughout the history 
of ASA. Traditional claims to scientific status for ASA have always been faced by 
what appears to be an insoluble contradiction: if ASA is scientific, its task is not to 
prescribe or suggest a course of action. but to provide scientific explanations and predic- 
tions; if, on the other hand. ASA aspires to guide action it must be prescriptive and per- 
suasive, and hence it cannot be scientific-not, at any rate, according to the received view 
of scientific method. Some writers have attempted to solve the dilemma by arguing that 
A SA offers 'scien tificall y-based" advice. But this argument is basically unsound since, 
as Hume showed two centuries there is no logical bridge between "nught" and "is." 
Why do methodologically conscious systems analysts keep raising the question 
about the scientific status of ASA, despite repeated failures to answer it satisfactorily? 
The reason, I suggest, is that behind it loom two issues which analysts rightly feel to be 
of crucial in-~prtmce for an ur~derstaidhg of whdt they are trying to do. First: what is 
the language of ASA, i-e.. what is the logical starus of the different propositions which an 
680n social interaction as a mode of problem solving, see Charles E. Lindblorn, Politics 
And Markets, New York: Basic Books, Inc, 1977. Whereas Lind blom treats analysis 
and social interaction as alternative ways of solving social problems, I stress the difficulty 
gf separating the two in practice. 
Feyerabend, Against Method, London: NLB, 1975, p.26. Italics in the o r ~ i n a l  
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analyst produces in the course of his work? Second: which standards of quality snd 
rules of methodological criticism are applicable to the different kinds of propositions? 
T h e  historical evolution of the second issue has been outlined in the preceding 
section. I r r  dixussing the fvst  issue, I shall make use of sinie concepts introduced there. 
ASA. I have argued, is a craft. T h e  systems analyst as craftsman is a producer of data, 
information, and arguments, but also a social change agent. He  must intluence some peo- 
ple to accept his proposals, and other people to carry them out; he is expected to take 
some responsibility for implementation. "Experienced practitioners realize that such im- 
plementation depends not only on factual analysis, but also on the client's organizational 
structure, the capabilities and biases of the client's personnel, and the client's management 
style.'70 In particular, successful implementation depends on the ability to persuade peo- 
ple that a proposed course of action is not only good for the organization, but also compa- 
tible with the self-interest of its members A well-designed incentive system is a very 
effective form of persuasive analysis. 
Often the analyst must even persuade the decisionmaker. For example, one 
of the important functions of systematic analysis is to point out what cannot be done, 
rather than what can; in other words, it is the duty of the analyst to make the decision- 
maker aware of constraints which he  would rather ignore. But aside from straightfor- 
ward physical and resource constraints, it is not usually possible to give a logically tight 
proof that a certain factor is an actual constraint, rather than simply a "problem." Hence 
the decisionmaker must be persuaded to accept some limitations on his freedom of choice 
on the basis of something less than a full proof. 7 l 
Perhaps we iari see now why the long-drawn debate whether ASA is 
descriptive (like 'pure s c i e n c e b r  prescriptive (like technology) has been so fruitless. 
A S A  IS concerned with theorizing, choosing, and acting. Hence, its character is three- 
7%arvey M. Wagner, "Commentary on O R S A  Guidelines," cit ,  p. B-611. 
' l ~ o r  a more detailed argumem and some examples, see Giandomenico Majone, T h e  
Feasibility of Social Policies" Policy Sciences. vol. 6. 1975, pp.49-69. 
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fold: descriptive (scientific), prescriptive (advisory), and persuasive (argumentative- 
interactive). In fact, if we look at the fine structure of analytic arguments we see a com- 
plex blend of factual statements, methodological choices, evaluations, recommendzti~ns, 
arid persuasive definitions and commuriications. An even more con~plex structure em- 
erges when we look at the interactions taking place between analysts and different audi- 
ences of sponsors, policy makers, evaluators, and interested pubkcs Moreover, descrip- 
tive propositions, prescriptions, and persuasion are intertwined in a way that rules out the 
possibility of applying a unique set of evaluative criteria, let alone conclusively proving or 
refuting an argument. As  I have tried to show, the historical pattern of development of 
ASA can be interpreted as the progressive realization of the complexity of the language 
of policy advice, and the slow evolution of appropriate forms of criticism. 
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